What is a good monetary policy rule for stabilizing the economy? In this paper, e cient policy rules are computed using the FRB US large-scale openeconomy macroeconometric model. Simple three-parameter policy rules are found to be very e ective at minimizing uctuations in in ation, output, and interest rates: Increases in rule complexity yield only trivial reductions in aggregate variability. Under rational expectations, e cient policies smooth the interest rate response to shocks and use the feedback from anticipated policy actions to stabilize in ation and output and to moderate movements in shortterm interest rates. Policy should react to a multi-period in ation rate rather than the current quarter in ation rate; in fact, targeting the price level, as opposed to the in ation rate, involves only small additional stabilization costs. These results are robust to parameter and model uncertainty and the imposition of the non-negativity constraint o n nominal interest rates. However, if expectations formation is invariant to policy, as in backward-looking models, the expectations channel is shut o and the performance of policies that are e cient under rational expectations may, as a result, deteriorate markedly; e cient policies, in contrast, exploit systematic expectational errors.
What is a goodmonetary policy rule for stabilizing the economy? Con dence in model-based answers to this question has waxed and waned over the last three decades. By the 1970s, application of optimal control techniques to estimated macro models appeared to provide a precise answer based on a concrete description of policy makers' preferences and the law of motion of the economy. This approach then came under attack from two sides. Lucas 1976 decried the fact that the structural parameters of the macroeconomic models used for policy evaluation were assumed to beinvariant t o policy, contradicting the notion of optimizing agents. Moreover, Kydland and Prescott 1977 argued that such policies were in any case time inconsistent, that is, a policy maker would nd it advantageous to deviate from the optimal" policy rule. In this paper, we evaluate monetary policy rules using the FRB US large-scale open-economy macroeconometric model, which, in response to the Lucas' Critique, features explicit intertemporal optimization-based microfoundations and rational expectations. We focus on simple rules, the transparency of which m a y increase the visibility of discretionary policy actions and thereby reduce their e ectiveness, lessening policymakers' incentive to deviate from the rule. The approach to evaluating monetary policy rules used in this paper follows the tradition dating to Phillips 1954 , in which a macroeconomic model is used to compute the policy that minimizes a measure of uctuations in prices, resource utilization, and interest rates. Because we are interested in the average" or longrun" performance of polices, we compute the unconditional moments that correspond to the outcomes from an in nitely long stochastic simulation of the model. 1 For backward-looking models, the computational burden of this analysis is generally not especially great. However, for forward-looking models with rational modelconsistent expectations, the computational cost can be orders of magnitude greater. The constraint on computer resources has forced past work in two directions. Policy evaluation using large-scale rational expectations models has been limited to comparisons of small sets of policies, as in Bryant, Currie, Frenkel, Masson and Portes 1989 , Bryant, Hooper and Mann 1993 , and Taylor 1993b . The alternative approach has been to use small-scale rational expectations models, as in Fischer 1977 , Phelps and Taylor 1977 , Taylor 1979 , Fuhrer 1997a An alternative approach is to conduct a single model simulation using the historical time series of residuals as disturbances McCallum 1988 and Fair and Howrey 1996 . This method has the advantage that simulated outcomes can be compared directly to the historical outcomes, but su ers from the disadvantage that results depend on the particular historical draw of disturbances and thus may not in general provide an accurate indication of the relative performance of policies. and von zur Muehlen 1996, and Svensson 1999a , for which the computation cost of computing moments is relatively low.
In addition to being easy to solve, small-scale models have the advantage of being relatively transparent. System properties are a function of a small set of parameters that often favor straightforward interpretation, such as the slope of the IS curve or the response of in ation to unemployment. Properties of large-scale models, on the other hand, depend on a large numberof parameter values, sectoral linkages, and shocks, which complicates the interpretation of results. Nonetheless, for policy evaluation, there are distinct advantages to models such as FRB US that provide a rich description of the economic environment facing policymakers.
One advantage of using the FRB US model is that it di erentiates between a wide range of disturbances to the economy and their idiosyncratic e ects across sectors. For example, productivity, imported oil prices, and wages are each modeled separately and their e ects on prices and real activity di er in signi cant w ays. In contrast, in small-scale models, disturbances to these variables are subsumed into the residuals of the price or potential output equations Ball and Mankiw 1995 . An important feature of the disaggregated nature of FRB US is that it includes estimated equations for various categories of trade, import prices, foreign variables, and the exchange value of the dollar. The exchange rate channel contributes a signi cant potion of the total e ect of monetary policy on prices and output Reifschneider, Tetlow and Williams 1999;  this channel is subsumed into the IS curve in small-scale models. Furthermore, the model accounts for changes in capital stocks and the value of wealth. In this way, the intertemporal linkages related to investment i n p h ysical capital and wealth accumulation are better described than in small-scale structural models constructed on a strictly ow basis.
Recent increases in computer speed and the development of more e cient model solution algorithms now make the detailed evaluation of monetary policies in largescale rational expectations models such as FRB US feasible. The results of such a n analysis are in many ways surprising. We nd that parsimonious speci cations of rules where the funds rate is determined by the lagged funds rate, a multi-period in ation rate, and the current output gap are very e ective at reducing variability i n in ation, output, and the short-term interest rate. Although the policy maker faces a complex world" in the FRB US model, increasing the numberofvariables in the policy rule beyond these three yields only trivial reductions in aggregate variability.
A k ey characteristic of successful policies under rational expectations is a strong degree of persistence in movements in the federal funds rate. E cient policies smooth the interest rate response to shocks and use the feedback from the anticipation that movements of the federal funds rate will be sustained to stabilize in ation and output, with only moderate movements in short-term interest rates. Speci cally, a small but sustained rise in the funds rate achieves the same change in the current bond rate as a large short-lived increase in the funds rate, but with far less variability in short-term interest rates Goodfriend 1991. Interestingly, targeting the price level rather than the in ation rate generates little additional cost in terms of output and in ation variability. Under price level targeting, the expectations channel helps stabilize in ation, thereby eliminating much of the output stabilization costs that would otherwise beassociated with reversing deviations of the price level from its target.
These results are robust to variations in parameter values and the speci cations of output dynamics and price dynamics, but the characteristics of e cient policy rules depend critically on the assumption regarding expectations formation. Under rational expectations, e cient policies take advantage of the expectations channel through which a n ticipated future policy actions feedback o n to the present. In backward-looking models, where expectations are policy-invariant functions of observable variables, this expectations channel is shut o and policies that, under rational expectations, rely on the e ects of anticipated movements in short-term interest rates typically perform poorly. This is found to be true in both the backwardlooking version of FRB US, as well as in other models with adaptive expectations such as that of Rudebusch and Svensson 1999 ; in fact, in the latter model, policy rules that react in a highly persistent manner and rules that target the price level can be destabilizing.
Policies that are e cient in the backward-looking models exploit predictable expectational errors inherent in such systems. Empirical evidence indicates that the FOMC has tended to respond in a gradual and persistent manner to changes in economic conditions Rudebusch 1995 , Clarida, Gali and Gertler 1997 , and Sack 1998 . Given this historical pattern for monetary policy, the estimated reducedform e ect of a change in the real short-term rate on real GDP will be quite large. In estimated backward-looking models, agents implicitly expect policy reactions to be highly persistent, so a movement in the short rate translates into a sizable movement in the long rate and real output. The result of this is that small transitory movements in the funds rate|which under the expectations theory of the term structure have little e ect on long-term bond rates and thereby output|have large real e ects in simulations of estimated backward-looking models. As a result, in such models, e ective policies are characterized by little or even negative intrinsic persistence in interest rates. In this way, they take advantage of the stabilizing in uence of the perceived policy without actually carrying out the expected actions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The rst section presents a brief description of the FRB US model and summarizes some of its basic properties. Section II analyzes the characteristics of e cient simple monetary policy rules in FRB US under rational expectations. Section III considers the sensitivity of these results to changes in parameter values and model speci cation. Section IV examines how the characteristics of e cient rules are a ected by a change in the the assumption regarding expectations formation. Section V concludes.
I. The FRB US Model
FRB US is an estimated large-scale structural rational expectations model of the world economy that was developed by the sta of the Board of Governors as a replacement for the MPS model. The model is of the stock-ow t ype. The U.S. economy is modeled in considerable detail, while a small set of reduced form equations is used for aggregate measures of foreign GDP, prices, and interest rates. FRB US is the product of several years of development and testing with the result that its dynamic and long-run properties accord well with those of the data. For example, model impulse responses generally match w ell those of small-scale VAR models and model second moments are reasonably close to those of the data Brayton, Levin, Tryon and Williams 1997a. For more detailed accounts of the model's design and properties, see Brayton and Tinsley 1996 , Brayton, Mauskopf, Reifschneider, Tinsley and Williams 1997b , and Reifschneider et al. 1999 In the model, households maximize lifetime utility and rms maximize the present discounted value of expected pro ts, subject to adjustment costs that hinder instantaneous adjustment of quantities following a change in fundamentals. To capture the inertia evident in many categories of spending and labor inputs, the gen-eralized adjustment cost model of Tinsley 1993 is used. This speci cation di ers from the standard quadratic adjustment model, in that it allows for the appearance of lagged growth rates in the estimated decision rules.
The model's wage-price block contains separate equations for the prices for domestic absorption, consumption goods, crude energy, non-oil import goods, oil imports, and labor compensation the employment cost index. Dynamics of the domestic absorption price index and the employment cost index are speci ed following Tinsley's generalized adjustment cost approach mentioned above. Current price in ation is determined by the existing level of the markup over labor and energy costs, recent past in ation, expected future growth in factor costs, and the expected level of resource utilization, with high utilization putting upward pressure on prices. Similarly, compensation growth is determined by the existing level of the productivity-adjusted real wage, past compensation growth, expected future growth in prices and productivity, and expected conditions in the labor market, with low unemployment relative to the NAIRU putting upward pressure on compensation growth.
A key feature of the speci cation of price dynamics, shared by the variant of staggered price setting introduced by Buiter and Jewitt 1981 and empirically implemented by Fuhrer and Moore 1995, is intrinsic inertia in the in ation rate. This property is controversial see the discussions of Fuhrer 1997b and Rotemberg and Woodford 1997 and contrasts sharply with that of the staggered price setting models of Calvo 1983 and Taylor 1980 , and the quadratic adjustment cost model of Rotemberg 1982 , each of which generates inertia in the price level but not the in ation rate, in the absence of serially correlated shocks. Overall, the FRB US model can be characterized as a hybrid model that incorporates more intrinsic persistence in prices and output than optimizing" rational expectations models such as those developed by Rotemberg and Woodford 1997 , King and Wolman 1999 , and McCallum and Nelson 1999 , but signi cantly less intrinsic persistence than in traditional backward-looking models developed by F air and Howrey 1996, Ball 1997, and Rudebusch and Svensson 1999. Given the sluggish adjustment of prices, monetary policy in uences the real short-term rate through changes in the nominal federal funds rate. Movements in the real short-term rate a ect real long-term rates, the real value of wealth, and the real exchange rate according to standard arbitrage conditions. In particular, long-term real rates on government and corporate debt, which in uence investment spending by rms and households, are described by the expectations theory of the term structure. The real value of corporate equities, a determinant of consumption and investment spending, depends on the real return to corporate debt. Uncovered interest rate parity links the expected change in the exchange value of the dollar, which a ects import and export volumes and import prices, to the interest rate di erential between the United States and other industrialized economies. In addition to these standard" channels of the monetary transmission mechanism, allowance is made in the model for credit market imperfections that cause spending by households and rms to be excessively" reliant on current income and cash ow, respectively.
B. Computing Model Moments
Much of the analysis of this paper involves computing unconditional second moments of aggregate variables. In order to make this computationally feasible, the model is log-linearized around sample means; the relevant dynamic properties of the model are virtually una ected by this approximation. In its companion form, the linearized system is given by Hansen and Sargent 1998 . This approach yields highly accurate answers more e ciently than does the standard method of stochastic simulations. Autocovariances are readily computed using the formula C j = A j C 0 .
On a Sun Ultra Enterprise 3000 computer|about as fast as an Intel Pentium II 300Mhz personal computer|the computation of the saddle path solution and the unconditional covariance matrix takes about 5 minutes for the FRB US model.
C. Model Properties
Detailed accounts of the dynamic properties of FRB US are reported in the articles cited above. For present purposes, we use autocorrelations of in ation and output to summarize the degree of inertia present in FRB US, and compare these outcomes to those found in the data. In computing model moments, we assume monetary policy follows a reaction function estimated over 1980 1997, given The basic speci cation of this reaction function is identical to that in Orphanides and Wieland 1998, but, owing to di erences in sample and the measure of the output gap, the estimated coe cients di er somewhat. It is worth noting that the large movements in in ation and output associated with 1980 82 disin ation help identify the in ation and output gap parameters in the reaction function. Dropping this period from the sample lowers the coe cients on the in ation rate and the change in the output gap, and causes the coe cient on the lagged funds rate to rise to about 0.9. The solid lines in Figure 1 show the unconditional autocorrelations of the output gap and the in ation rate implied by the model, given the estimated reaction function. Unless otherwise noted, in this paper, in ation" refers to the annualized one-quarter change in the PCE price index. The dashed lines show the estimated autocorrelations using quarterly data from 1980-97. The dotted lines show the one standard error bands for the data-based estimates. As seen in the top panel of the gure, the model's predictions for the autocorrelation of output closely track those found in the data. The model underpredicts somewhat the persistence of in ation relative to that seen in the data. Nevertheless, the di erences are generally small in both the economic and statistical senses.
II.Policy Frontiers
We e v aluate monetary policy rules using policy frontiers" that measure the best obtainable pairs of unconditional variances of the output gap, 2 y , and the in ation rate, 2 , subject to the constraint that the unconditional standard deviation of the funds rate, i , does not exceed a speci ed value k. By varying k, we can draw the three-dimensional surface that represents the constraints the model places on the policymaker, in terms of the policy objectives of stabilizing in ation, output, and short-term interest rates. We refer to the policies that underly these frontiers as frontier policies." Note that this approach di ers from a common practice found in the literature, see, for example Rudebusch and Svensson 1999 , where interest rate variability is included directly in the policy objective. The advantage of our approach is that one can analyze the constraints on policy independently of the preferences over the three types of variability.
Each point on a frontier corresponds to a di erent relative w eight on in ation and output variability. Speci cally, a frontier is computed by solving the minimization problem min 2 y + 1 , 2 6 s:t: x t = Ax t,1 + Be t ; i t = z t ; z t x 0 t ; x 0 t,1 ; 2 i k 2 ; for values of on the unit interval. We restrict ourselves to policies that yield a saddle point equilibrium. The rst constraint is that the law of motion of the system begiven by the reduced form of the saddle point solution consistent with the speci ed policy rule. The second constraint is that the federal funds rate always beset according to the policy rule, which is assumed to beknown by the public. The third constraint is that the unconditional variance in the funds rate does not exceed the speci ed value of k 2 . Note that interest rate variability is measured by the variance of the level of the funds rate. The basic results from the FRB US model are unchanged if interest rate variability is instead measured by the variance of the one-quarter change in the funds rate, as in Levin, Wieland and Williams 1999. The constraint o n i n terest rate variability plays an important role in the results presented below. According to the FRB US model, if there were no constraint on interest rate variability, frontier policies would generate wild swings in the funds rate. The variability o f i n terest rates has no direct e ect on prices and quantities in the model. However, a number of reasons have been suggested why such v olatility in short-term rates may be undesirable. One is political: Policymakers may wish to avoid reversals in the direction of policy out of the fear that such actions may be misinterpreted as mistakes," which may eventually have consequences for central bank independence. A second argument is that the term premium paid on bonds may be positively related to the variance in expected short-term rates, in which case, there is a long-run tradeo between the volatility of short-term interest rates and potential output through the e ect of the term premium on the cost of capital and thereby the capital-output ratio Tinsley 1998. This relationship is not incorporated in the FRB US model. Third, the hypothesized invariance of model parameters to changes in policy rules is likely to be stretched to the breaking point under policies that di er so dramatically in terms of funds rate variability from those seen historically.
The general speci cation of policy rules analyzed in this paper bears comment. We allow policy to react to contemporaneous variables, an assumption McCallum 1997 has criticized on the grounds that policymakers do not in fact possess accurate information regarding the current state of the economy. Nonetheless, the results in this paper are unchanged if we assume policy can only react to lagged data. Levin et al. 1999 and McCallum and Nelson 1999 similarly nd that enforcing a singlequarter lag to the policy response is not very important for the analysis of policy rules in rational expectations macro models. A potentially more di cult issue, not taken up in this paper, is the persistent mismeasurement of the output gap, as discussed by Orphanides 1998 and Rudebusch 1998 . Another issue is the non-negativity constraint on nominal interest rates, which, in order to keep computational costs from becoming prohibitive, we ignore for most of this paper; we return to this topic at the end of this section.
A. Basic Characteristics of Frontier Policies
The rst step in analyzing optimal simple policy rules is the choice of variables on the right-hand side of the reaction function. Evaluation of numerous candidate variables led to the selection of three main variables: the current level of the output gap, a multi-period measure of in ation,, and the lagged funds rate. Mathemati-cally, the class of policy rules we consider is given by i t = i i t,1 + 1 , i r t + 4 t + t , + y y t ; 7 where r is the long-run equilibrium real interest rate, 4 is the four-quarter in ation rate, and is the in ation target assumed to be xed. A necessary condition for policy to bestabilizing is that 0. We assume the policy rule is followed exactly; hence, the inclusion of the lagged funds rate is identical to specifying the rule in terms of the level of the funds rate responding to a weighted sum of current and past output gaps and deviations of in ation from target.
As noted, we nd that the current output gap is the best choice for a single variable to measure resource utilization, in terms of the design of simple policy rules. Candidate measures of utilization that do not fair as well include the unemployment rate, which tends to bea lagging indicator relative to the output gap, the change in the output gap, or, similarly, the growth rate of real GDP, which ignores useful information on the level of resource utilization, and multi-period averages of the output gap.
The best choice of a measure of in ation for inclusion in the policy rule is generally not the current quarter's in ation rate. Instead, according to the FRB US model, policy should in general respond to a much smoother" measure of in ation, speci cally, the growth rate of prices over the last three years. This measure of ination evidently lters out the high frequency noise in the in ation process, leaving policy to react to sustained movements in in ation or core" in ation. By reacting to a smooth in ation measure, policy implicitly purchases a reduction in output and funds rate variability at the cost of some high frequency variability in in ation. Figure 2 shows policy frontiers resulting from di erent choices for the measure of the multi-period in ation rate appearing in the policy reaction function. Here, and throughout this paper, policy frontiers are displayed in terms of the standard deviation of the annualized one-quarter in ation rate, , and the standard deviation of the output gap, y . For each frontier in Figure 2 , the standard deviation of the funds rate is constrained to be less than or equal to 4, with the constraint binding in each case. As an aid in interpreting the gures, reference values of are indicated for the frontier corresponding to frontier rules that respond to the three-year in ation rate.
Except in the extreme cases in which the weight on output variability is near zero or unity, reacting to the three-year in ation rate yields nontrivial improvements in stabilization over the one-quarter or one-year in ation alternatives. Lengthening the measure of in ation beyond three years causes stabilization performance to deteriorate. If the weight on output variability, , is near zero, policy has more freedom to counteract high frequency in ation movements and therefore the bene ts of reacting to a smoothed in ation measure are diminished. At the other extreme, if the weight on output variability is near unity, the coe cient on the in ation gap is very close to zero, so the choice of in ation measure is irrelevant.
A related result is the goodperformance of frontier price level targeting rules, that is, rules that react to deviations of the price level from a predetermined deterministic trend, shown by the thin solid line in Figure 2 . Price level targeting rules outperform, in terms of in ation and output stabilization, rules that react to the one-year in ation rate for values of 0:1, and perform nearly as well as rules that react to the three-year in ation rate for values of 1=2. This result may appear surprising given the fact that under a price level targeting rule, any movement in in ation must be fully reversed over time; that is, the cumulative deviations of ination from the target price growth rate must bezero. For example, following a positive shock to in ation, policy must act to bring the in ation rate below trend: The in ation rate must overshoot its long-run target level. In an in ation-based rule regime, policy only needs to bring in ation back on track, so the policy response, and the associated reduction in resource utilization, can be more muted than in the case of price level targeting Lebow, Roberts and Stockton 1992. In forward-looking rational expectations models such as FRB US, the conventional wisdom regarding a policy of price level targeting can be misleading. 3 Some overshooting of in ation may be desirable owing to the e ect of expected in ation on current in ation. 4 By construction, a price level targeting policy guarantees that the sum of future in ation rates equals the negative of the existing gap between the price level and the target. In general, this gap is positively related to the current in ation rate, so a price level targeting policy fosters expectations of below-trend in ation when in ation is high and the opposite when in ation is low. These expectations work to counteract the e ects of in ation inertia in the model.
B. Coe cients of Frontier Policies
Unless otherwise indicated, we focus on rules where policy reacts to the threeyear in ation rate for the remainder of the analysis using the FRB US model. The upper left panel of Figure 3 shows three policy frontiers, computed for values of k = 3; 4; and 6. As the constraint o n i n terest rate variability is relaxed, the frontiers move inward toward the origin. These frontiers along with those for larger values of k not shown in the gure illustrate the degree of diminishing returns, in terms of output and in ation stabilization, to interest rate variability. Starting from a frontier policy corresponding to a moderate amount o f i n terest rate variability, further increases in interest rate variability yield only modest stabilization bene ts.
The other three panels of Figure 3 show the parameter values of the frontier policy rules. To ease comparison to the frontiers, the horizontal axis in each panel of this gure measures the standard deviation of in ation; the vertical axis gives the coe cient value. Rightward movements along the curve correspond to increasing values of . As one would expect, the coe cient on in ation the output gap declines rises as the weight on output variability in the objective function increases, 3 The conventional wisdom regarding the disadvantages of price level targeting has also been undermined by S v ensson 1999b, who shows in a theoretical model that price level targeting can be more e ective at stabilizing in ation and unemployment than in ation targeting if the monetary authority cannot commit to its actions in advance. 4 The same principle applies to output dynamics, as discussed in Levin et al. 1999 . and both the in ation and output gap coe cients increase as the constraint on interest rate volatility is relaxed. A more striking result is the large coe cient on the lagged funds rate, i , in frontier rules. Indeed, except for cases where is close to zero, i is very close to, or in some cases even exceeds, unity. This result is even stronger if the frontiers are computed using policy rules that react to the one-year, not three-year, in ation rate; in that case, for k = 4, i = 0:85 for = 0, and i equals or exceeds unity for all values of 0:15.
The result that frontier rules generally smooth the interest rate reaction to changes in economic conditions stems fundamentally from the constraint on the variability o f the short-term interest rate see Levin et al. 1999 for a more complete analysis of this issue. FRB US incorporates the expectations theory of the term structure; hence, a small and persistent expected rise in the funds rate achieves the same change in the bond rate as one that is large, but short-lived. Given a de-sire to avoid uctuations in short-term rates, the e cient response to an undesired increase in output or in ation is to hold the funds rate at an elevated level for an extended period of time Goodfriend 1991. Given this policy response, the expectation of high future short rates has the desired e ect on the bond rate and the level of resource utilization, while uctuations in the funds rate are held to a minimum.
One potential disadvantage to policy rules with values of i near unity is that, even if the change in the funds rate is in the right direction, the level of the real funds rate may not be appropriate for the current state of the economy. For example, if resource utilization is high for a period of time, the real funds rate will rise above its long-run equilibrium level. In the absence of further disturbances, resource utilization will return to its equilibrium level; however, at that point in time, the real funds rate will still be exerting a contractionary impetus, causing the economy to overshoot. To the extent that such overshooting is excessive and reduces stabilization performance, it counteracts some of the bene ts of smoothing interest rate responses discussed above. This interaction of the costs and bene ts of smoothing interest rate movements is illustrated by the upper right panel of Figure 3 , which shows that relaxation of the constraint o n i n terest rate variability|which diminishes the bene ts of smoothing interest rates|reduces the value of i in frontier policies, but generally by only a small amount.
Given that the value of i is near unity for many frontier rules, it is of interest to measure the performance of the class of rst-di erence" rules for which i is constrained to equal unity. Figure 4 compares the outcomes from such rst-di erence rules to those for which i is freely chosen; in both cases the frontiers are computed under the binding constraint that i 4. Not surprisingly, given the results from above, the loss from simplifying the rule to have a value of i equal to unity is generally trivial. Only in cases where the policy objective places very little weight on variability of the output gap does the restriction cause a noticeable deterioration in stabilization performance. The gure also shows the frontier for policies where i is constrained to equal zero. Except for cases where is near zero, such level" rules perform worse than rst-di erence rules. on very simple policy rules with no more than three variables. Abstracting from the claimed bene ts of parsimony, optimal control theory argues that policy should respond to all the states of the system. Nevertheless, after considerable experimentation, we nd that four-, ve-, and six-parameter frontier rules yield only trivial gains over three-parameter frontier rules in minimizing the variances of output and in ation. For example, adding coe cients on combinations of lagged in ation rates, output gaps, or funds rates yields no measurable improvement in stabilization performance. Similarly, w e found only trivial gains from including equity or bond prices or spending components to the policy rule. According to the model, the current output gap, a multi-period in ation rate, and the lagged funds rate are su cient statistics for setting monetary policy. Admittedly, i t m a y be the case that policies that react t o a m uch larger set of variables outperform simple three-parameter rules; however, as argued in Levin et al. 1999 , policies that are so nely tuned to a speci c model's structure may be a poor guide to policy if the model is misspeci ed.
D. The Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates
In an environment of low in ation, linear policy rules can prescribe interest rates well below zero Madigan 1997 and Orphanides and Wieland 1998 . As noted, throughout most of this paper, we do not explicitly incorporate the non-negativity constraint on nominal rates into the policy rule. Here, we brie y summarize some relevant results from Reifschneider and Williams 1999, which analyzes the e ects of the zero lower bound on the performance and design of monetary policy rules in FRB US. We focus on the e ect of imposing the zero bound on the outcomes from rst-di erence frontier policy rules computed under the constraint that i 4.
In the absence of the zero bound or some other factor that causes policy to deviate from the rule, the rst-di erence speci cation can equivalently be written as one in which the level of the funds rate reacts to the sum of current and past gaps. In the context of the zero bound, however, these two descriptions are not identical because under the rst-di erence speci cation any past constraint o n the funds rate is perpetuated through policy's response to the lagged funds rate. Indeed, simulations indicate that under unmodi ed rst-di erence speci cations, the detrimental e ects of the zero bound can be quite substantial. For this reason, it is important that policies bespeci ed such that the level of the funds rate responds to cumulative past in ation and output gaps, not the lagged funds rate.
The frequency and magnitude of prescribed violations of the non-negativity constraint are negatively related to the equilibrium nominal interest rate|the sum of the equilibrium real rate plus the in ation target|which we denote by i . In the FRB US model, for values of i of 5 and above, the zero bound has only trivial e ects on the performance of frontier rst-di erence policy rules. A reduction in i from 5 to 4|a reduction in the in ation target of one percentage point|results in a very small increase in the variability of in ation and output. The marginal stabilization cost rises as the equilibrium nominal funds rate is lowered further. Nevertheless, even with a value of i of 2, a level consistent with zero or slightly negative long-run in ation, the stabilization cost due to the e ects of the zero bound are relatively small, on the order of the shift in the frontier shown in Figure 3 that results from lowering the constraint o n i from 6 to 3.
Why is the cost from the zero bound so small for rst-di erence frontier policies? One reason is that these rules, when speci ed in terms of reacting to cumulative past in ation and output gaps, implicitly take into account past constraints on policy. Because the current setting of the funds rate depends on all past output and in ation gaps, policy tends to beeasy|relative to the level dictated by current conditions alone|in the periods following a contraction. Anticipation of this behavior causes long bond rates to decline during a contraction even while the current funds rate is constrained to be zero.
III.Parameter and Model Uncertainty
A frequent criticism of model-based policy evaluation is that it is by its nature model-speci c McCallum 1988. Considerable uncertainty exists regarding parameter estimates and the appropriate speci cation of model equations. In this section, we entertain a numberof issues related to parameter and model uncertainty. We nd that the basic results regarding the design of e cient policy rules are robust to uncertainty regarding key parameter values and the speci cation of price and output dynamics.
A. Parameter Uncertainty
Because the FRB US model contains literally hundreds of estimated coe cients, it is computationally prohibitive to conduct a complete analysis of the e ects of parameter uncertainty on the characteristics of frontier policies. Nevertheless, the FRB US model can beviewed as a disaggregated version of a small-scale rational expectations structural model. Two key parameters for the design of monetary policy in such a small model are the interest-sensitivity of aggregate demand and the sensitivity of in ation to movements in resource utilization the slope of the Phillips curve. 5 To capture these general categories of parameter uncertainty, we vary the coe cients on the cost of capital terms in the spending equations and the coe cients on the gap between the unemployment rate and the NAIRU in the 5 A third important factor is the speed of adjustment of spending and prices. Analysis of this factor is more involved than that conducted here. The results from the model uncertainty exercise in Levin et al. 1999 and summarized below, however, provide some insight into this aspect of parameter uncertainty.
wage and price markup equations. All other model parameters and the variancecovariance of the model residuals are left unchanged.
For the study of the e ects of parameter uncertainty, it is useful to explicitly incorporate interest rate smoothing into the objective function. For this purpose, we modify our approach and compute optimal" policies that solve the problem min where 0 measures the degree of aversion to interest rate variability. We continue to focus on three-parameter policy rules. To make the results comparable to those reported above, we set = 0 :01, which yields an unconditional standard deviation of the funds rate of about 4 under the optimal rule for = 1 =2.
Our approach to incorporating parameter uncertainty into the computation of optimal policies follows that of robust control Hansen and Sargent 1997. Instead of computing optimal rules for a speci ed distribution of model parameters, we simply posit a region within which the parameters may lie. The robust control policy rule minimizes the worst possible outcome over the speci ed parameter region. For present purposes, we de ne the allowable parameter region to include model coefcients relating to the interest-sensitivity o f spending that lie within two standard errors of their point estimates and coe cients relating to the slope of the Phillips curve that lie within one standard error of their point estimates. 6 The upper portion of Table 1 shows the optimal simple rules for ve v alues of , assuming no parameter uncertainty. The lower portion of the table shows the corresponding robust control simple rules. The worst" constellation of parameter values is the one where both the interest-sensitivity of demand and the unemploymentsensitivity of in ation are at the lower bounds of their respective allowable regions; that is, the worst-case scenario is one where policy is relatively ine ective, both directly at a ecting demand, and indirectly, through the e ect of resource utilization on in ation. The response of the robust control policy to the current output gap and in ation rate is weaker than the simple optimal policy, but, except for the 6 The choice of two standard error bands for the coe cients relating to the interest-sensitivity of demand re ects the greater precision with which these coe cients are estimated relative t o t h e coe cients relating to the slope of the Phillips curve, the t-statistics of which are below 2 . case of = 1, the larger coe cient on the lagged funds rate implies that the robust control response is more persistent. The concern that policy may be relatively ine ective|that is, large uctuations in interest rates are needed to move output and in ation|leads to a substitution towards policies that contain uctuations in interest rates at the cost of greater variability in in ation and output. The result that policy is more timid under robust control is the opposite of that of Stock 1999 who nds that robust control policies are more aggressive in the context of the small-scale backward-looking model developed by Rudebusch and Svensson 1999 . The key issue is the tradeo between in ation output stabilization and a desire to minimize uctuations in interest rates. The reduction in policy e ectiveness creates both a substitution" and an income" e ect. The income e ect is related to the worsening of the outcome under the optimal control rule owing to the diminished e ect of interest rate movements on output and in ation. The substitution e ect is related to the reduced e ectiveness of a given movement in the funds rate at a ecting output and in ation. In FRB US the substitution e ect dominates for the examples considered here; as a result, a concern for parameter uncertainty tends to strengthen the desirability o f a high degree of interest rate smoothing large value of i .
B. Model Uncertainty
Uncertainty regarding models goes beyond the estimation of certain macroeconomic relationships. The FRB US model represents just one particular set of choices regarding model design and speci cation. Levin et al. 1999 examine the e ects of di erent features of model design and speci cation by computing policy frontiers for the FRB US, Moore 1995, Taylor 1993b , and Orphanides and Wieland 1998 models. The constraint o n i n terest rate volatility i s g i v en in terms of the variance of the rst-di erence of the funds rate, but otherwise the methodology is the same as in the present paper. Each of these models belong to the class of estimated structural rational expectations models. Nonetheless, the speci cation of the dynamics of real activity and prices di er signi cantly across models, particular in terms of the persistence of output and in ation. In all four models, in the preferred speci cation for simple three-parameter rules, policy reacts to the lagged funds rate, current output gap, and a multi-period measure of in ation. For moderate degrees of interest rate variability, all four models prescribe coe cients close to unity on the lagged funds rate for frontier rules. Indeed, a striking result is that simple frontier rules from FRB US are found to be highly e cient in the three other models.
One issue not explicitly addressed in Levin et al. 1999 is the optimal choice for the duration of the multi-period in ation rate included in the policy rule and the cost, in terms of output and in ation volatility, of targeting the price level vs. the in ation rate. Figure 5 shows frontiers for the Fuhrer-Moore model and a linearized version of John Taylor's multicountry model, computed in the same manner as Figure 2 is for FRB US. 7 The basic results regarding the choice of the duration of the in ation measure in the policy rule are the same in these models as in FRB US. One minor di erence is that in the Taylor model, policies that react to the one-year in ation measure slightly outperform those that react to the three-year in ation measure if is near zero. In all three models, the stabilization costs associated with switching from a frontier in ation targeting rule to a frontier price level targeting rule are modest. 
IV. Expectations Formation
A key assumption of the preceding analysis is that expectations are consistent with the model structure and the policy rule in place. A numberof authors have used backward-looking models, that is, models where the expectations process is invariant to the policy rule, for policy rule evaluation Fair and Howrey 1996 , Ball 1997 , and Rudebusch and Svensson 1999 . The characteristics of frontier or optimal policies in such models can di er signi cantly from those computed from FRB US and other structural rational expectations models. These discrepancies may be in part due to other di erences in model design and speci cation. To address this issue, we examine the performance of policy rules in a version of FRB US in which expectations are assumed to beformed using a xed VAR model of the economy. In this way, w e are able to modify the assumption regarding the formation of expectations, while holding the remaining model structure xed.
For this exercise, we compute outcomes for ve representative policy rules. Table 2 gives the coe cients based on the speci cation i t = i i t,1 + 1 , i r t + 4 t + 4 t , + y y t + y y t :
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The rst line in the table corresponds to the estimated reaction function reported in equation 5. The second and third lines represent level" rules that have been discussed extensively in the literature. The fourth rule is a representative rstdi erence rule. The nal rule is a representative frontier price level targeting rule;
in this speci cation, the in ation gap, 4 , is replaced by the four-quarter average of the price level gap, 1 4 P 3 i=0 log P t,i , log P t,i , where P is the level of the PCE price index and P is its predetermined target value. Table 3 reports the outcomes|the unconditional standard deviations of in ation, the output gap, the funds rate, and the change in the funds rate|resulting from the ve rules in FRB US under two alternative assumptions regarding expectations formation. The upper set of outcomes are computed under the assumption of rational expectations. The lower set of outcomes are computed under the assumption that rms and households use vector autoregressive models to forecast relevant macroeconomic prices and quantities. The VAR models used for forecasting are estimated on the actual historical data, but are assumed to be invariant t o changes in the policy rule for this analysis: private agents forecast with the same VAR regardless of the policy rule. Two aspects of these results are noteworthy. First, switching from rational expectations to VAR-based expectations reverses the relative performance of level" and rst-di erence" rules in FRB US. In the policy reaction function that makes up part of the VAR model used for forming expectations, the sum of the coe cients on the lagged funds rate is about 0.95 and the sums of the coe cients on the in ation and output gaps are less than 0.1. Agents assume that movements in the funds rate will be highly persistent, but not as persistent as in rst-di erence rules. Hence, under the rst-di erence rule, the public systematically underpredicts the size and persistence of the policy response to aggregate disturbances, making such policies less e ective than is the case under rational expectations. Under level rules, such as the Taylor 1993a and Henderson and McKibbin 1993 rules, the public systematically overpredicts the persistence of the policy response, with the result that such policies are more e ective than in the absence of this policy misperception. Similarly, price level targeting involves a signi cantly larger loss in stabilization under VAR-based expectations. The public uses a forecasting model based on a regime of in ation targeting, which s h uts o the stabilizing e ects of the expectations The contrast in outcomes relating to expectations formation is even more dramatic if an estimated small-scale backward-looking model is used in place of FRB US under VAR-based expectations. To illustrate this point, we e v aluate the performance of policy rules and compute frontiers using a model similar to that of Rudebusch and Svensson 1999 . The model consists of three equations: a dynamic IS curve relating the output gap to the level of the real funds rate and lags of the output gap, an accelerationist Phillips curve, and the monetary policy rule. Model details are given in the appendix. Table 4 shows the outcomes from this estimated backward-looking model for the policy rules described in Table 2 . The most striking nding is the abysmal performance under both the rst-di erence and the price-level targeting rules. The economy is barely stable under the rst-di erence rule; the price-level targeting rule is in fact destabilizing, indicated by the unconditional moments being in nite. 8 These results generalize to other parameterizations of rst-di erence and price level targeting rules. The poorperformance of these types of policies is related to the existence of a strong accelerator e ect in output and the fact that output reacts to the real short-term interest rate. Movements in the funds rate that are highly persistent, owing either to large values of i or attempts to reverse in ation shocks, 8 These results mirror those of von zur Muehlen 1995, who showed using a simple macro model that interest rate smoothing policy rules that are stabilizing if expectations are forward-looking can be destabilizng if in ation expectations are backward-looking. cause output to overshoot dramatically, which can lead to dynamic instability. The same does not occur in the FRB US model under VAR-based expectations, in part because, in that model, output responds primarily to long-term interest rates which only partially respond to current short-term rates. The characteristics of three-parameter frontier policies in this model depend on how interest rate variability is measured. The left panels of Figure 6 show the outcomes when the constraint on funds rate variability i s speci ed in terms of the variance of the level of the funds rate. In this case, frontier policies tend to have negative persistence, that is, i 0; in fact, the value of i is typically below -0.4.
The e cient policy response to a shock is a sharp and quickly reversed movement of the funds rate. Such a policy move would have little e ect on prices and output in a world where bond rates are determined by the expectations theory of the term structure and expectations are rational, but, in this model, the policy is very e ective because it systematically takes advantage of the public's misperception of policy.
The right panels of the gure show the outcomes when the constraint is speci ed in terms of the variance of the change of the funds rate. In this case, e cient policies generally exhibit some inherent positive persistence with larger values of i associated with tighter constraints on the variance of the change in the funds rate.
In no case, however, are frontier policies characterized by v alues of i close to unity.
The di erence between the results is explained by the fact that, in this model, the only transmission channel is the direct e ect of movements in the real funds rate on output. Owing to the lagged responses of output and in ation, a policy that features quick reversals provides a timely countercyclical impulse to output without engendering overshooting. The downside to such a policy is that the funds rate jumps around from quarter to quarter, even if the unconditional variance is relatively low. Thus, when the constraint on policy is in terms of the change in the funds rate, policies with strong negative inherent persistence are abandoned in favor of those that generate less dramatic quarter-to-quarter swings.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we evaluate classes of simple monetary policy rules using the FRB US large-scale open-economy macroeconometric model. We nd that simple policy rules are very e ective at minimizing the uctuations in in ation, output, and interest rates: Complicated rules yield trivial stabilization bene ts over ecient simple rules. E cient rules smooth the interest rate response to shocks and use the feedback from anticipated policy actions to stabilize in ation and output and to moderate movements in short-term interest rates. Policy should react to a multi-period in ation rate rather than the current quarter in ation rate. Indeed, targeting the price level|equivalent to an in nite horizon in ation rate|generates little additional cost in terms of output and in ation variability o ver that associated with in ation targeting policies. The e ectiveness of e cient simple rules is little diminished by the imposition of the non-negativity constraint on nominal interest rates.
These results are robust to reasonable variations in parameter values and the speci cation of output and price dynamics. However, the characteristics of e cient policy rules depend critically on the assumption regarding expectations formation. Under rational expectations, e cient policies take advantage of the expectations channel through which a n ticipated future policy actions feedback o n to the present. In backward-looking models, where expectations are implicitly policy-invariant functions of observable variables, policies that are e cient under rational expectations may perform poorly, and e ective policies exploit systematic expectational errors.
Given the degree of model uncertainty, such a divergence of outcomes may argue against policies that are e cient under rational expectations but perform poorly under adaptive expectations Taylor 1998. An alternative interpretation is that the results from backward-looking models are suspect for the very reason Lucas elucidated in his famous Critique; that is, any change in policy will systematically alter the structure of econometric models" implying that comparisons of the effects of alternative policy rules using current macroeconometric models are invalid regardless of the performance of these models over the sample period or in ex ante short-term forecasting" Lucas 1976. Backward-looking models may simply be ill-suited for the evaluation of the long-run properties of monetary policy rules that di er signi cantly from those experienced historically. This is not to say that such analysis is without merit or value. In the absence of a satisfactory description of the process by which policy expectations are formed and modi ed, policy evaluation based on backward-looking models may berelevant, especially for horizons of a few years, if adjustment of expectations formation to changes in policy is gradual. If, on the other hand, adjustment is rapid and the transition period during which agents update their expectations is short, the assumption of rational expectations may better approximate the environment facing policymakers at all horizons. 
